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Abstract
We present program shepherding, a method for monitoring control flow transfers dur-
ing program execution in order to enforce a security policy. Program shepherding
provides three basic techniques as building blocks for security policies. First, pro-
gram shepherding can restrict execution privileges on the basis of code origins. This
distinction can ensure that malicious code masquerading as data is never executed,
thwarting a large class of security attacks. Second, shepherding can restrict control
transfers based on instruction type, source, and target. Finally, shepherding guaran-
tees that sandboxing checks around any program operation will never be bypassed.
Security attacks use inevitable bugs in trusted binaries to coerce a program into
performing actions that it was never intended to perform. We use static and dynamic
analyses to automatically build a custom security policy for a target program, which
specifies the program's execution model. An accurate execution model restricts control
flow transfers only to the intended ones and can thwart attacker attempts to alter
program execution. For example, shepherding will allow execution of shared library
code only through declared entry points. Finer specifications can be extracted from
high-level information present in programs' source code - for example, which values
a function pointer may take. Program shepherding will allow indirect calls only to
their known targets, and function returns only to known callers. These analyses
build a strict enough policy to prevent all deviations from the program's control flow
graph and nearly all violations of the calling convention. This technique renders most
security vulnerabilities unexploitable and thwarts current and future security attacks.
We present an efficient implementation of program shepherding's capabilities in
the DynamoRIO [6, 7] runtime code modification system. The resulting system im-
poses minimal performance overhead, operates on unmodified binaries, and requires
no special hardware or operating system support.
Thesis Supervisor: Saman P. Amarasinghe
Title: Associate Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Remote exploitation of program vulnerabilities poses a very serious threat to our mod-
ern information infrastructure. It allows rapid automatic self-propagating programs
(worms) to gain control over large number of hosts [57]. Grave secondary effects
are possible due to the extent to which critical infrastructure relies on the Internet.
Worms usually exploit well-known security vulnerabilites since flawed software is quite
often left unpatched. For example, a recent worm worthy of a CERT Advisory [91
(CA-2003-04), propagates by exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft's SQL Server an-
nounced six months earlier (CA-2002-22). The worm infected most vulnerable hosts
within 10 minutes [42]. Although it has no malicious payload it wrought considerable
damage by secondary effects of network outages, e.g. in ATM networks. Notably,
even the vendor of the flawed software had unpatched systems, and this shows the
inadequacy of the patch deployment process even for already known vulnerabilities.
At the other end of the spectrum, vulnerabilities that are not publicly disclosed may
be used in an attack specifically targeting a security sensitive entity. This thesis
introduces techniques that can effectively render most security vulnerabilities unex-
ploitable and thence mitigate disruptions due to distributed denial of service attacks.
We have implemented them in a software system which provides a secure execution
environment while imposing minimal performance overhead.
The goal of most security attacks is to gain unauthorized access to a computer
system by taking control of a vulnerable program. This is generally done by exploit-
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ing bugs that allow overwriting stored program addresses with pointers to malicious
code. An attacker who gains control over a program can simply inject code to perform
any operation that the overall application has permission to do. Hijacking trusted
applications which are typically run with global permissions, such as login servers,
mail transfer agents, and web servers, gives full access to machine resources. Vulnera-
bilities allowing remote execution of arbitrary code and their exploitation account for
34 of the 37 CERT Advisories [9] for 2002. Today's most prevalent attacks use buffer
overflow and format string vulnerabilities to overwrite program addresses. Our threat
model of security attacks assumes that an attacker is able to exploit inadvertent pro-
gram vulnerabilities to gain random write access to arbitrary memory locations in
the program address space.
Nearly all attacks have one thing in common: they coerce a target program into
performing actions that it was never intended to perform. In short, they violate the
execution model followed by legitimate program runs. The execution model encom-
passes the Application Binary Interface (ABI) and higher-level specifications from the
program's source programming language. The model also incorporates components
specific to the program, for example, which values a particular function pointer may
take.
A program's execution model is invariably narrower than that imposed by the
underlying hardware. As such, there is typically no efficient way to require that the
rules of this execution model be adhered to. The result is that the execution model
becomes, in practice, a convention rather than a strict set of rules. If this model were
enforced, and only program actions that the programmer intended were allowed, a
majority of current security holes would be closed. Whenever the execution model
allows only a single choice, or choices equivalent in their system effects, an attacker
cannot gain new abilities. For example, a common attack type overwrites a return
address to point to a malicious destination. If this destination is not a valid return
target in the program's execution model, it would be disallowed by an enforcement
of the model.
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1.1 Overview
In this thesis, we employ program shepherding [38] to enforce a security policy. Instead
of attempting to protect data, program shepherding monitors control flow in order
to enforce a program's execution model. Program shepherding provides three basic
techniques: restricted code origins to prevent execution of data or modified code,
restricted control transfers to preclude deviations from the execution model, and un-
circumventable sandboxing checks around any type of program operation.
The execution model implicitly provided by the programs according to the Appli-
cation Binary Interface (ABI) can be extracted dynamically. For example, shepherd-
ing will allow execution of shared library code only through exported entry points,
and can ensure that a return instruction only targets instructions after a call. Finer
specifications of the execution model can be extracted statically from high-level in-
formation present in programs' source code - for example, which values a function
pointer may take. Program shepherding will allow indirect calls only to their known
targets, and function returns only to instructions after their known callers.
We use static and dynamic analyses to automatically build a custom security
policy for a target program which specifies the program's execution model. This
process requires no user interaction, but is able to build a strict enough policy to
prevent all deviations from the program's control flow graph and nearly all violations
of the calling convention. Therefore it greatly reduces the possibility of an unintended
program action. Our static analyses require source code access but not recompilation.
We have efficiently implemented program shepherding capabilities in the Dy-
namoRIO [6, 7 runtime code modification system. DynamoRIO executes only san-
itized copies of the original program code and stores these in a trusted code cache.
This code cache is the first key feature to providing efficient secure execution, because
it allows many security checks to be performed only once. A second key feature of
DynamoRIO is the creation of traces, hot streams of code that cross control flow
transitions. Security checks on indirect control flow transitions can be elided when
execution follows the trace. These features result in a secure system that imposes
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minimal performance overhead, operates on unmodified native binaries, and requires
no special hardware or operating system support. Our program shepherding im-
plementation on top of DynamoRIO supports both Windows and Linux on IA-32
processors. However, the detailed security discussion in this thesis is mainly focused
on Linux applications.
1.2 Organization
In Chapter 2 we classify the types of security exploits that we are aiming to prevent.
Program shepherding's three basic techniques are described in Chapter 3. The exe-
cution model and how to enforce it is discussed in Chapter 4. We analyze features
of the execution model that can be enforced with reasonable cost using program
shepherding in Chapter 5, where we also identify aspects of enforcement that can
be performed dynamically when source code is unavailable. In Chapter 6 we dis-
cuss how we implement program shepherding efficiently, and how to prevent attacks
directed at our system itself. We show how to incorporate static analyses to auto-
matically extract features of the program's execution model such as its call graph in
Chapter 7. We present experimental results and the performance of our system in
Chapter 8. We demonstrate that enforcing a program's execution model via program
shepherding can thwart many security attacks. We give experimental evidence that
the execution model can be enforced efficiently and effectively using a runtime code
modification system. We discuss related work in Chapter 9, propose future extensions
in Chapter 10, and conclude this thesis in Chapter 11.
18
Chapter 2
Security Exploits
This section provides some background on the types of security exploits we are tar-
geting to prevent. We dissect security exploits along three basic characteristics: the
program vulnerability being exploited, the stored program address being overwritten,
and the malicious code that is then executed.
2.1 Program Vulnerabilities
The C language memory model allows unsafe writes to objects which are often unin-
tended by programmers. Most programmers code with the assumption that program
objects are accessible only via valid references, which is the logical memory model [60].
However, numerous unsafe language features result in bugs that break this model, e.g.
pointer arithmetic with no bounds checking, variadic arguments, dangling pointers,
weak types, unions. All provide venues for overwriting other than the intended ob-
jects.
Currently, the most-exploited classes of program bugs involve buffer overflow [46,
13, 8], integer overflow [5], and format string [45, 12] vulnerabilities. These vulnera-
bility classes are reported in respectively 22, 3, and 2 of the CERT advisories [9] for
2002 together with 4 advisories for other program bugs.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities are present when a buffer with weak or no bounds
checking is populated with user supplied data. A trivial example is unsafe use of
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the C library functions strcpy or gets. This allows an attacker to corrupt adjacent
structures containing program addresses, most often return addresses kept on the
stack [13]. Integer overflow and integer signedness problems allow attackers to bypass
imprecise bound checking code, which can then cause typical buffer overflow problems.
Buffer overflows affecting a regular data pointer, for example an output argument of
a function, can actually have a more disastrous effect by allowing a memory write to
an arbitrary location on a subsequent use of that data pointer. One particular attack
corrupts the fields of a double-linked free list kept in the headers of malloc allocation
units [36]. On a subsequent call to free, the list update operation
this-±prev -+next = this-+next ;
will modify an arbitrary location (controlled by prev) with an arbitrary value (next).
Format string vulnerabilities also allow attackers to modify arbitrary memory lo-
cations with arbitrary values and often out-rank buffer overflows in recent security
bulletins [12, 45]. A format string vulnerability occurs if the format string to a func-
tion from the printf family ({ , f , s, sn}printf , syslog) is provided or constructed
from data from an outside source. The most common case is when printf (str) is
used instead of printf ("%s",str). 1 As another example, a well-intended security
logging facility syslog (LOGINFO, str) ironically introduces a serious vulnerability.
The first problem is that attackers may introduce conversion specifications to enable
them to read the memory contents of the process. The real danger, however, comes
from the %n conversion specification which directs the number of characters printed
so far to be written back. The location where the number is stored and its value can
easily be controlled by an attacker with type and width specifications, and more than
one write of an arbitrary value to an arbitrary address can be performed in a single
attack.
It is very difficult to prevent all exploits that allow address overwrites, as they
are as varied as program bugs themselves. All of the above bugs have been found
10f course, the proper C idiom in this case is fputs(str, stdout).
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exploitable in circumstances reducing them to an arbitrary write problem. More
than one write to disjoint memory ranges may also be performed, either in result of a
single intrusion or of repeated careful intrusions. We assume from now on a program
vulnerability exists, which allows random write accesses with attacker chosen values.
In most security attacks modifying data is simply the means to executing a sequence
of instructions that will ultimately compromise the whole system. Attackers induce
this by overwriting a stored program address that will be used in an indirect control
transfer.
2.2 Stored Program Addresses
Security exploits can attack program addresses stored in many different places. Buffer
overflow attacks target addresses adjacent to the vulnerable buffer. The classic return
address attacks and local function pointer attacks exploit overflows of stack allocated
buffers. Global data and heap buffer overflows also allow global function pointer
attacks and setjmp structure attacks. Data pointer buffer overflows, malloc overflow
attacks, and %n format string attacks are able to modify any stored program address
in the vulnerable application - in addition to the aforementioned addresses, these
attacks target entries in the atexit list, .dtors destructor routines, and in the Global
Offset Table (GOT) [20] of shared object entries. In the assumed arbitrary write
threat model, any function pointer or other stored address that is later supplied to an
indirect control transfer instruction (such as return, indirect call, or indirect jump)
provides a vector to a potential attack.
Program addresses are credibly manipulated by a number of entities. For example,
dynamic loaders patch shared object functions; dynamic linkers update relocation ta-
bles; and language runtime systems modify dynamic dispatch tables. Generally, these
program addresses are intermingled with and indistinguishable from data. In such an
environnent, preventing a control transfer to malicious code by stopping illegitimate
memory writes is next to impossible. It requires the cooperation of numerous trusted
and untrusted entities that need to check many different conditions and understand
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high-level semantics in a complex environment. The resulting protection is only as
powerful as the weakest link.
2.3 Malicious Code
Using the privileges of the application, an attacker can cause damage by executing
newly injected malicious code or by maliciously reusing already present code. Cur-
rently, the first approach is prevalently taken and attack code is implemented as new
native code that is injected in the program address space as data [46]. Modifying any
stored program address to point to the introduced code triggers intrusion when that
address is used for control transfer. New code can be injected into various areas of
the address space: in a stack buffer, static data segment, near or far heap buffer, or
even the Global Offset Table. Since normally there is no distinction between read and
execute privileges for memory pages (this is the case for IA-32), the only requirement
is that the pages are writable during the injection phase.
It is also possible to reuse existing code by changing a stored program address and
constructing an activation record with suitable arguments. For example, a simple
but powerful attack changes a function pointer to the C library function system, and
arranges the first argument to be an arbitrary shell command to be run. Similar
attacks may be launched to the arguments of any system call normally accessible to
the application. Note that reuse of existing code can also include jumping into the
middle of a sandboxed application operation, bypassing the sandboxing checks and
executing the operation that was intended to be protected. In addition, a jump into
the middle of an instruction (on IA-32 instructions are variable-sized and unaligned)
could cause execution of an unintended and possibly malicious instruction stream,
which will not be visible even in manual inspection of normal dissasembly; however,
such an attack is very unlikely.
An attacker may be able to form higher-level malicious code by introducing data
carefully arranged as a chain of activation records, so that on return from each func-
tion execution continues in the next function of the chain [44]. The prepared activa-
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tion record return address points to the code in a function epilogue that shifts the
stack pointer to the following activation record and continues execution in the next
function.
Modifying the targets of a suitable sequence of indirect calls as well as their argu-
ments also may allow an attacker to produce higher-level malicious code. Undetected
sequential intrusions may also allow orchestration of existing pieces of code to produce
an unintended malicious outcome. While attacks of this kind are currently not widely
publicized, a determined attacker can easily steer an application in this fashion.
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Chapter 3
Program Shepherding
The program shepherding approach to preventing execution of malicious code is to
monitor all control transfers to ensure that each satisfies a given security policy. This
allows us to ignore the complexities of various vulnerabilities and the difficulties in
preventing illegitimate writes to stored program addresses. Instead, we catch a large
class of security attacks by preventing execution of malevolent code. We do this by
employing three basic techniques: restricted code origins, restricted control transfers,
and un-circumventable sandboxing. The following sections describe these techniques,
while Chapter 5 discusses how to combine them to build efficient security policies.
3.1 Restricted Code Origins
In monitoring all code that is executed, each instruction's origins are checked against
a security policy to see if it should be given execute privileges. This restriction can be
used to ensure that malicious code masquerading as data is never executed, thwarting
the largest class of current security attacks. Code origins are classified into these
categories: from the original image on disk and unmodified, dynamically generated
but unmodified since generation, and code that has been modified. Finer distinctions
could also be made. We describe in Section 6.3 how to distinguish original code from
modified and possibly malicious code.
Additional hardware flag for execute permissions on memory pages can provide
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similar features to our restricted code origins. However, it cannot by itself duplicate
program shepherding's capabilities because it cannot stop inadvertent or malicious
changes to protection flags. Program shepherding uses its un-circumventable sand-
boxing to prevent this from happening by monitoring all such privileged operations,
e.g. system calls that change page protection. Furthermore, program shepherding
provides more than one bit of privilege information, hence distinguishable code ori-
gins allow different execute privileges to be specified by security policies for each
type.
3.2 Restricted Control Transfers
Program shepherding allows arbitrary restrictions to be placed on control transfers in
an efficient manner. These restrictions can be based on both the source and destina-
tion of a transfer as well as the type of transfer (direct or indirect call, return, jump,
etc.). Indirect calls, indirect jumps, and returns obtain their targets from data, which
can be modified by an attacker. Enforcing the execution model involves allowing each
branch to jump only to a specified set of targets. For example, the calling convention
could be strengthened by requiring that a return instruction only target the instruc-
tion after a call. Stricter policies may allow indirect calls only to their apriori known
targets, and function returns only to instructions after their known callers. These re-
strictions can prevent attackers from forming malicious code sequences from existing
code. Different policies for determining the valid transition sets and the trade-offs
between security, performance and applicability will be discussed in Section 5.2.
3.3 Un-Circumventable Sandboxing
Program shepherding provides direct support for restricting code origins and control
transfers. Execution can be restricted in other ways by adding sandboxing checks on
all other types of instructions of particular interest, for example privilege changing
instructions. Customized policies can be added to validate system call arguments
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to limit data attacks. With the ability to monitor all transfers of control, program
shepherding is able to guarantee that these sandboxing checks cannot be bypassed.
Sandboxing without this guarantee can never provide true security - if an attack
can gain control of the execution, it can jump straight to the sandboxed operation,
bypassing the checks. In addition to allowing construction of arbitrary security poli-
cies, this guarantee is used to enforce the other two program shepherding techniques
by protecting the shepherding system itself (see Section 6.6).
27
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Chapter 4
Execution Model Enforcement
The execution model of a program includes several components. At the lowest level,
the Application Binary Interface (ABI) specifies the register usage and calling con-
ventions of the underlying architecture, along with the operating system interface
mechanism. Higher-level conventions come from the source language of the program
in the form of runtime data structure usage, expected interaction with the operating
system, and usage of system libraries. Finally, the program itself is intended by the
programmer to perform a limited set of actions.
Even the lowest level, the ABI, is usually not efficiently enforceable when there is
no hardware support. There is no support for ensuring that calls and returns match,
and it is prohibitively expensive to directly implement this in software. For this rea-
son, the execution model is a convention rather than a strictly enforced set of rules.
However, most security exploits come from violations of the execution model. Over-
writing a stored program address lets an attacker control further program execution.
However, transfer of control to that code should not allowed be under the program's
execution model. Enforcing the model would thwart these security attacks.
Restrictions on data usage are very difficult to enforce efficiently because dis-
tinguishing memory references requires expensive runtime checks on every memory
access. Most security attacks target not just any data, but data storing program ad-
dresses. Even limiting data protection to these locations, protecting the data incurs
significant performance costs[13]. We restrict our enforcement of the execution model
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to the set of allowed control transfers. Although caused by abnormal data operations,
unintended program actions will surface as unintended control flow. We will show
how to obtain accurate control transfer specifications and that an execution model
can be efficiently enforced.
4.1 Degree of Freedom
The degree of freedom of an attacker is given by the size of the set of allowed values for
an attacked stored program address. Ideally, these sets should be singletons, because
in a real program execution at any point there is only one valid value (in the absence
of race conditions). Therefore, we aim to minimize the size of the sets and convert
them to singletons when possible.
4.2 Context-Insensitive Policies
Our first aim is to determine the points-to sets for function pointers by using an
accurate static analysis. We use a flow-insensitive and context-insensitive analysis,
discussed in detail in Chapter 7, to gather the sets of valid targets for indirect calls.
Using that information we construct the complete call graph for the program. Targets
of return instructions are then computed from the graph, since the instructions after
caller sites of a function constitute the only valid targets for its exit point.
If we assume that the only security relevant events are due to system calls, we
can perform reachability analysis to identify the system calls accessible from each of
the functions in a set, up to a node dominated by all targets in the set. If different
execution paths can reach different system calls, then an attacker has a choice of
action for constructing a malicious sequence. (We may make a further unification by
assuming the order of system calls is immaterial since attackers may be interested
in any of them.) Whenever the system call sets are all equivalent (in the best case
all being empty), we can accept any valid target in a set, because changing a stored
pointer from one value to another provides no new abilities to an attacker.
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In the following example with vulnerable code, the only accepted values for the
function pointer f are {sin,cos}, but not system for that matter.
double eval(double f(double), double x, char* msg) {
printf(msg, x); // format string vulnerability
return f(x);
}
void sincos(char* usermsg) {
eval(sin, 0, usermsg);
eval(cos, 0, "cos(Xf)");
}
If an attacker can never cause deviations from the trace of system calls, then the
only vector of attack left is changing their arguments. Simple stateless system call
sandboxing may be successfully employed to limit the arguments to those statically
predicted, however this type of automatic policy generation is not covered in this
thesis.
Context-insensitive policies make an attacker's life much more difficult, narrowing
potential attack targets from any instruction in the program to a small handful.
The program's control-flow graph and call graph can be enforced using only context-
insensitive policies, as such graphs are themselves context-insensitive. However, the
execution model is more than the control flow graph, which still allows unrealizable
program paths. For one thing, the program model should incorporate the calling
convention, which restricts each return to have exactly one target - the return site of
the caller depending on the context of invocation. In our example, a return address
overwrite may still lead to an (innocuous) omission of the second execution of eval.
One approach is to enforce the calling convention by introducing sandboxing checks
to match call and return pairs. There are also a number of schemes we can use to
reduce the size of allowed targets further without incurring high overheads.
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4.3 Selective Code Duplication
Even the most accurate static analysis will not produce only singleton sets for context-
insensitive policies. However, dynamic program transformations may be applied to
further reduce the points-to sets. We can try to partition the set of targets by dy-
namically applying program transformations on the generated traces.
We can apply program specialization with respect to function pointers passed as
arguments, which is a common use case. This way way the target set of a function
pointer's later uses is a singleton set. In our example, this will result in two versions
of eval specialized on the different function pointers passed, which would be useful
if the sets reached valuable system calls.
Furthermore, leaf functions can be partially inlined in traces from their callers,
therefore they are also effectively reduced to singletons. A simple compare with
the value of the singleton replaces the hash table lookup when detection of security
violations is desired, otherwise it can be elided in a trace. In order to reduce the
degree of freedom of return overwrite attacks, leaf functions with large fan-in can
be selectively cloned and thus the return set of the original function is partitioned
into smaller sets. In general, static analysis can determine each definition and use
of a pointer used as an indirect branch target, and by selectively duplicating code
from different definitions we can obtain selective flow- and context-sensitivity in the
execution traces dynamically generated by the runtime system.
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Chapter 5
Security Policies
Program shepherding's three techniques can be used to provide powerful security
guarantees. They allow us to strictly enforce a safe subset of the instruction set ar-
chitecture and the operating system interface. There are tradeoffs between program
freedom and security: if restrictions are too strict, many false alarms will result when
there is no actual intrusion. This section discusses the potential design space of secu-
rity policies that provide significant protection by limiting attackers degree of freedom
while preserving program correctness. We envision a system with customizable policy
settings to allow the maximum protection level for each application. Our philosophy
is to start with a completely safe subset and examine the causes of false alarms. The
responsible operation is potentially dangerous, so its restrictions should be relaxed
only so far as to reduce false alarms to a reasonable level while maintaining as much
security as possible. Table 5.1 lists sample policy decisions that can be implemented
with program shepherding. Our system currently implements a set of security policies
for which allows normal execution for most application binaries, and a more restric-
tive set when static analysis of source code provides an accurate execution model.
The applicability and attack resilience of these policies are described and analyzed
later in this chapter.
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Restricting Least restrictive Most restrictive
Code Any Dynamically Only code from Only code
origins written code, if disk, can be dy- from disk,
self-contained namically loaded originally
and has no loaded
system calls
Function Any Only to Only to known Random xor Return only
returns after-call call sites as in Stack- from called
targets Ghost [26] function
Intra- Any Only to function entry points Only to bindings
segment given in an in-
call or terface list
jump
Inter- Any Only to export of Only to im- Only to bindings
segment target segment port of source given in an in-
call or segment terface list
jump
Indirect Any Only to address Only within Only to bindings
calls stored in read- user segment given in an in-
only memory or from library terface list
execve Any Static argu- Only if the oper- None
ments ation can be val-
idated
open Any Disallow writes Only to a sub- None
to specific region of the file
files, e.g. system
/etc/passwd
Table 5.1: Sample list of policies built using program shepherding. Each row shows a
continuum of choices ranging from most restrictive on the right to least restrictive on
the left for how to control the action in the left-hand column. Bold entries indicate
the policy choices that we implemented for our experimental system for binaries with
no external information. Italicized entries show the more restrictive policies in place
when an execution model is provided statically.
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5.1 Code Origin Policies
Consider the policy decision in the upper right of the table: allowing unrestricted
execution of code only if it is from the original application or library image on disk
and is unmodified. Such a policy will allow the vast majority of programs to execute
normally. Yet the policy can stop all security exploits that inject code masquerading
as data into a program. This covers a majority of currently deployed security attacks,
including the classic stack buffer overflow attack.
Shared libraries that are explicitly loaded (i.e., with diopen or LoadLibrary) and
dynamically selected based on user input should also be considered potentially unsafe
unless properly validated. A relaxation of this policy allows dynamically generated
code, but requires that it contain no system calls. Legitimate dynamically-generated
code is usually used for performance; for example, many high-level languages employ
just-in-time compilation [2, 19] to generate optimized pieces of code that will be
executed natively rather than interpreted. This code almost never contains system
calls or other potentially dangerous operations. For this reason, imposing a strict
security policy on dynamically-generated code is a reasonable approach. Similarly,
self-modifying code should usually be disallowed, but may be explicitly allowed for
certain applications.
5.2 Control Transfer Policies
Direct control transfers that satisfy the code origin policies can always be allowed
within a segment. Given that we limit execution models to those that disallow self-
modifying code, direct control transfers will always perform as the program intends,
as they are part of the code itself and cannot be modified by an attacker as guaranteed
by the other techniques. Calls and jumps that transition from one executable segment
to another, e.g., from application code to a shared library, or from one shared library
to another, can be restricted to enforce library interfaces. Targets of inter-segment
calls and jumps can be verified against the export list of the target library and the
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import list of the source segment, in order to prevent malevolent jumps into the
middle of library routines.
Indirect control transfers can be carefully limited. The calling convention can
be strengthened by preventing return instructions from targeting non-call sites, and
limiting direct call sites to be the target of at most one return site. Controlling
return targets severely restricts exploits that overwrite return addresses, as well as
opportunities for stitching together fragments of existing code in an attack.
Indirect calls can be completely disallowed in many applications. Less restrictive
general policies are needed, but they require higher-level information and/or compiler
support. For C++ code it is possible to keep read-only virtual method tables and
allow indirect calls using targets from these areas only. However, further relaxations
are needed to allow callback routines in C programs. A policy that provides a general
solution requires source access, compiler support, profiling runs, or other external
sources of information to determine all valid indirect call targets (Chapter 7). A
more relaxed policy restricts indirect calls from libraries no more than direct calls
are restricted (if between segments they can only target import and export entries),
while calls within the application text segment can target only intra-segment function
entry points. The requirement of function entry points beyond a simple intra-segment
requirement prevents indirect calls from targeting direct calls or indirect jumps that
validly cross executable segment points and thus avoid the restriction. It is possible
to extract the valid user program entry points from the symbol tables of unstripped
binaries. Unfortunately, stripped binaries do not keep that information.
Indirect jumps are used in the implementation of switch statements and dynam-
ically shared libraries. The first use can easily be allowed when targets are validated
to be coming from read-only memory and are hence trusted. The second use, shared
library calls, should be allowed, but such inter-segment indirect jumps can be re-
stricted to library entry points. These restrictions will not allow an indirect jump
instruction that is used as a function return in place of an actual return instruction.
However, we have yet to see such code. It will certainly not be generated by compilers
since it breaks important hardware optimizations in modern IA-32 processors [47].
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5.3 Sandboxing Policies
Sandboxing can provide detection of attacks that get past other barriers. For example,
a data attack that overwrites the argument passed to the system routine may not be
stopped by any aforementioned policy. Program shepherding's guaranteed sandboxing
can be used for intrusion detection for this and other attacks. The security policy must
decide what to check for (for example, suspicious calls to system calls like execve)
and what to do when an intrusion is actually detected. These issues are beyond the
scope of this thesis, but have been discussed elsewhere [30, 39].
A further on return target restriction can easily be provided to emulate a technique
proposed in StackGhost [26]. A random number can be xor-ed with the return address
stored on the stack after a call and before a return. Any modification of the return
address will result with very high probability in a request for an invalid target. In
a threat model in which attackers can only write to memory, this technique renders
execution of the attacker's intended code very unlikely. This protection comes at
the low cost of two extra instructions per function call, but its additional value is
hard to determine due to the already limited applicability of this kind of exploit.
Furthermore, an attacker able to exploit a vulnerability that provides random read
rights will not be stopped by this policy. Thus, we currently do not impose it. Instead
we propose using a parallel stack in an inaccessible to the application area in memory
and cached in hardware registers (XMM, or RSB - see Section 10.2), to match returns
with their respective caller.
Sandboxing with checks around every load and store could be used to ensure that
only certain memory regions are accessed during execution of untrusted code seg-
ments. This would provide significant security but at great expense in performance,
unless largely independent modules are to be isolated [65].
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Attack Type
Injected Code Existing Code
Single Calls Chained Calls Multiple Calls
Return Indirect Return Indirect
Jump or Jump or
Call Call
Not Imported Not Imported
Imported Imported
With Information No
(e.g., Symbol Information
Table)
Restricted code origins
Restricted control transfers
Un-circumventable sandboxing
Figure 5-1: Capabilities of program shepherding's three techniques toward stopping
different attack types, for the security policy indicated in bold in Table 5.1. The three
boxes represent the three components. A filled-in box indicates that that component
can completely stop the attack type above. Stripes indicate that the attack can
be stopped only in some cases. The vertical order of the techniques indicates the
preferred order for stopping attacks. If a higher box completely stops an attack, we
do not show techniques below it (e.g., sandboxing is capable of stopping some attacks
of every type, but we show its use only when the other techniques do not provide full
protection).
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5.4 Attack Resilience
We now turn our attention to a specific security policy made up of the bold entries in
Table 5.1. We implemented this policy in our prototype system when only a program
binary is available. For this security policy, Figure 5-1 summarizes the contribution of
each program shepherding technique toward stopping the types of attacks described
in Section 2. The following sections describe in detail which policy components are
sufficient to stop each attack type.
5.4.1 Injected Code Attacks
The code origin policy disallows execution from address ranges other than the text
pages of the binary and mapped shared libraries. This technique stops all exploits that
introduce external code, and will eradicate a majority of currently deployed security
attacks. However, code origin checks are insufficient to thwart attacks that change a
target address pointer to point to existing code in the program address space.
5.4.2 Existing Code Attacks
Most vulnerable programs are unlikely to have code that could be maliciously used
by an attacker. However, all of them have the standard C library mapped into their
address space. The restrictions on inter-segment control transfers limit the available
code that can be attacked to that explicitly declared for use by the application. Still,
many of the large programs import the library routines a simple attack needs. For
this reason, restricting inter-segment transitions to imported entry points would stop
only a few attacks.
Return address attacks, however, are severely limited: they may only target code
following previously executed call instructions. With more accurate execution models
they are even further limited only to their respective callers.
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Single Calls
By single call attack we mean an attack that overwrites only a single program address
(perhaps overwriting non-address data as well), thus resulting in a single malicious
control transfer. We consider the readily available execve system call to be the
most vulnerable point in a single-call attack. However, it is possible to construct an
intrusion detection predicate [39] to distinguish attacks from valid execve calls, and
either terminate the application or drop privileges to limit the exposure. Since only
a single call can be executed, system calls that need to be used in combination for an
intrusion do not need to be sandboxed. Sandboxing execve also prevents intrusion
by an argument overwrite attack.
Nevertheless, sandboxing alone does not provide protection against sequences of
operations that an application is allowed to do and can be controlled by an attacker.
For example, an exploit that emulates the normal behavior of sshd, i.e., listens on
a network socket, accepts a connection, reads the password file for authentication,
but at the end writes the password file contents to the network, cannot be stopped
by simple sandboxing. The mimicry attacks introduced [62] and further analyzed by
Wagner [64] show how attackers can easily evade intrusion detection at the system call
level. Therefore, restrictions on control transfers are crucial to prevent construction
of such higher-level code from primitives, and hence to limiting possible attacks only
to data attacks targeting unlikely sequences of existing code.
Chained Calls
An attacker may be able to execute a malicious code sequence by carefully construct-
ing a chain of activation records, so that on return from each function execution
continues in the next one [44]. Requiring that return instructions target only call
sites is sufficient to thwart the chained call attack, even when the needed functions
are explicitly imported and allowed by inter-segment restrictions. The chaining tech-
nique is countered because of its reliance on return instructions: once to gain control
at the end of each existing function, and once in the code to shift to the activation
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record for the next function call.
Multiple Calls
We were able to construct applications that were open to an exploit that forms higher-
level malicious code by changing the targets of a sequence of function calls as well as
their arguments. Multiple sequential intrusions may also allow execution of higher-
level malicious code.
It is also possible to extract the valid user program entry points from the symbol
tables of unstripped binaries. Allowing indirect calls to target only valid entry points
within the executable and within the shared libraries limits the targets for higher-
level code construction. If there are no simple wrappers in the executable that allow
arbitrary arguments to be passed to the lower level library functions, the possibility
of successful attack of this type will be minimal.
Higher-level semantic information is needed to thwart these attacks' intrusion
method by limiting the valid indirect call targets. The policy that is able to stop
such attacks in general, and without any false alarms, requires an execution model to
provide the list of valid transfers. Whenever the degree of freedom of an attacker is
limited to equivalent actions malicious sequences will never be constructed.
Nevertheless, interpreters that are too permissive are still going to be vulnerable
to data attacks that may be used to form higher-level malicious code and will not be
recognized as a threat by these techniques.
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Chapter 6
Efficient Implementation of
Program Shepherding
In order for a security system to be viable, it must be efficient. In order to be
widely and easily adoptable, it must be maximally transparent to its users. Trans-
parency includes whether a target application must be recompiled or instrumented
and whether the security system requires special hardware or operating system sup-
port. We examined possible implementations of program shepherding in terms of
these two requirements of efficiency and transparency.
One possible method of monitoring control flow is instrumentation of application
and library code prior to execution to add security checks around every branch in-
struction and privileged operation. Significant runtime components would also be
needed to overcome the difficulties of statically handling indirect branches by merg-
ing information about dynamically loaded libraries and verifying that all modules
are properly instrumented. In addition, the invariably introduced checks will impose
significant performance penalties.
Another possibility is to use an implementation in an interpreter. Interpretetation
is the most straightforward solution to provide complete mediation of control transfers
on native binaries. It is a natural way to monitor program execution because every
application operation is carried out by a central system in which security checks can
be placed. However, interpretation via emulation is slow, especially on an architecture
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START basic block builder trace selector
dispatch - - - ----- - -
context switch
indirect branch lookup sndita e ranch
Figure 6-1: Flow chart of the DynamoRIO system infrastructure. Dark shading
indicates application code. Note that the context switch is simply between the code
cache and DynamoRIO; application code and DynamoRIO code all runs in the same
process and address space. Dotted lines indicate the performance-critical cases where
control must leave the code cache and return to DynamoRIO.
like IA-32 with a complex instruction set, as evidenced in Table 6.1.
6.1 Dynamic Optimization Framework
Recent advances in dynamic optimization have focused on low-overhead methods
for examining execution traces for the purpose of optimization. This infrastructure
provides the exact functionality needed for efficient program shepherding. Dynamic
optimizers begin with an interpretation engine. To reduce the emulation overhead,
native translations of frequently executed code are cached so they can be directly
executed in the future. For a security system, caching means that many security
checks need be performed only once, when the code is copied to the cache. If the
code cache is protected from malicious modification, future executions of the trusted
cached code proceed with no security or emulation overhead.
We decided to build our program shepherding system as an extension to a dynamic
optimizer called DynamoRIO [7]. DynamoRIO is based on top of an IA-32 port [6] of
Dynamo [3]. DynamoRIO's optimizations are still under development. However, its
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baseline performance is already reasonable for many applications (see Section 8.3).
DynamoRIO is implemented on IA-32 for both Windows and Linux, and is capable
of running large desktop applications.
A flow chart showing the operation of DynamoRIO is presented in Figure 6-1.
The figure concentrates on the flow of control in and out of the code cache, which
is the bottom portion of the figure. The copied application code looks just like the
original code with the exception of its control transfer instructions, which are shown
with arrows in the figure.
Below we give an overview of DynamoRIO's operation, focusing on the aspects
that are relevant to our implementation of program shepherding. The techniques of
program shepherding fit naturally within the DynamoRIO infrastructure. Most mon-
itoring operations only need to be performed once, allowing us to achieve good per-
formance in the steady-state of the program. In our implementation, a performance-
critical inner loop will execute without a single additional instruction beyond the
original application code.
6.2 DynamoRIO: Runtime Introspection and Op-
timization
DynamoRIO copies basic blocks (sequences of instructions ending with a single control
transfer instruction) into a code cache and executes them natively. At the end of
each block the application's machine state must be saved and control returned to
DynamoRIO (a context switch) to copy the next basic block. If a target basic block
is already present in the code cache, and is targeted via a direct branch, DynamoRIO
links the two blocks together with a direct jump. This avoids the cost of a subsequent
context switch.
Indirect branches cannot be linked in the same way because their targets may
vary. To maintain transparency, original program addresses must be used wherever
the application stores indirect branch targets (for example, return addresses for func-
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Normalized
System Type Execution Time
crafty vpr
Emulation 300.0 300.0
+ Basic block cache 26.1 26.0
+ Link direct branches 5.1 3.0
+ Link indirect branches 2.0 1.2
+ Traces 1.7 1.1
Table 6.1: Performance achieved when various features are added to an interpreter,
measured on two of the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56], crafty and vpr. Pure emulation
results in an estimated slowdown factor of several hundred. Successively adding
caching, linking, and traces brings the performance down dramatically.
tion calls). These addresses must be translated into their corresponding code cache
addresses in order to jump to the target code. This translation is performed as a fast
hash table lookup. Security policies that restrict indirect control transfers are put in
place by varying this hash table lookup.
To improve the efficiency of indirect branches, and to achieve better code layout,
basic blocks that are frequently executed in sequence are stitched together into a unit
called a trace. When connecting beyond a basic block that ends in an indirect branch,
a check is inserted to ensure that the actual target of the branch will keep execution
on the trace. This check is much faster than the hash table lookup, but if the check
fails the full lookup must be performed. The superior code layout of traces usually
amortizes the overhead of creating them and often speeds up the program [3, 51].
For context-insensitive security policies, no extra checks are required when execution
continues across an indirect branch in a trace.
Table 6.1 shows the typical performance improvement of each enhancement to the
basic interpreter design. Caching is a dramatic performance improvement, and adding
direct links is nearly as dramatic. The final steps of adding a fast in-cache lookup for
indirect branches and building traces improve the performance significantly as well.
The Windows operating system directly invokes application code or changes the
program counter for callbacks, exceptions, asynchronous procedure calls, setjmp, and
the SetThreadContext API routine. These types of control flow are intercepted in
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order to ensure that all application code is executed under DynamoRIO [6]. Signals
on Linux are similarly intercepted. Security checks can be placed at the interception
points, similarly to indirect branches. These abnormal control transfers are rare and
so extra checks upon their interception do not affect overall performance.
6.3 Restricted Code Origins Implementation
Restricting execution to trusted code is accomplished by adding checks at the point
where the system copies a basic block into the code cache. Checking code origins
involves negligible overhead because code need only be checked once prior to insertion
into the code cache. Once in the cache no checks need to be executed.
Code origin checking requires that DynamoRIO know whether code has been
modified from its original image on disk, or whether it is dynamically generated. This
is done by write-protecting all pages that are declared as containing code on program
start-up. In normal ELF [20] binaries, code pages are separate from data pages and
are write-protected by default. Dynamically generated code is easily detected when
the application tries to execute code from a writable page, while self-modifying code
is detected by monitoring calls that unprotect code pages.
If code and data are allowed to share a page, we make a copy of the page, which
we write-protect, and then unprotect the original page. The copy is then used as the
source for basic blocks, while the original page's data can be freely modified. A more
complex scheme must be used if self-modifying code is allowed. Here DynamoRIO
must keep track of the origins of every block in the code cache, invalidating a block
when its source page is modified. The original page must be kept write-protected
to detect every modification to it. The performance overhead of this depends on
how often writes are made to code pages, but we expect self-modifying code to be
rare. Extensive evaluation of applications under both Linux and Windows has yet to
reveal a use of self-modifying code. For our prototype, we limit execution models to
applications with no self-modifying or dynamically generated code, which is the case
for the targeted security sensitive applications.
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6.4 Restricted Control Transfers Implementation
The dynamic optimization infrastructure makes monitoring control flow transfers very
simple. For direct branches, the desired security checks are performed at the point of
basic block linking. If a transition between two blocks is disallowed by the security
policy, they are not linked together. Instead, the direct branch is linked to a routine
that announces or handles the security violation. These checks need only be performed
once for each potential link. A link that is allowed becomes a direct jump with no
overhead.
Indirect control transfer policies add no performance overhead in the steady state,
since no checks are required when execution continues on the same trace. Otherwise,
the hash table lookup routine translates the target program address into a basic block
entry address.
6.4.1 Transfer Type Restrictions
Policies that only examine the target of a control flow transition are the cheapest to
enforce. A separate hash table is used to look up the target for validation for differ-
ent types of indirect control transfers (return instruction, indirect calls, and indirect
branches). Security checks for indirect transfers that only examine their targets have
little performance overhead, since we place in the hash table only targets that are
allowed by the security policy. This enables type specific restrictions without sacrific-
ing any performance when execution continues in the code cache. Targets of indirect
branches are matched against entry points of PLT-defined [20] and dynamically re-
solved symbols to enforce restrictions on inter-segment transitions, and targets of
returns are checked to ensure they target only instructions after call sites.
6.4.2 Transition Pair Restrictions
Our static analyses produce context-insensitive policies, which can be easily enforced
with minimal overhead. This is because context-insensitive policies are always valid
after initial verification, therefore they can be cached and cheaply evaluated with
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minimal execution overhead. Our execution model policies need to examine both the
source and the target of a transition, which will have a slightly slower hash table
lookup routine when shared tables are used. These checks can be optimized to be as
efficient as only checking the target by using a separate hash table for each source
location. The space drawback of this scheme is minor as equivalent target sets can be
shared, and furthermore, the hash tables can be precomputed to be kept quite small
without increase in access time.
6.5 Un-Circumventable Sandboxing Implementa-
tion
When required by the security policy, DynamoRIO inserts sandboxing into a basic
block when it is copied to the code cache. In normal sandboxing, an attacker can
jump to the middle of a block and bypass the inserted checks. DynamoRIO only
allows control flow transfers to the top of basic blocks or traces in the code cache,
preventing this.
An indirect branch that targets the middle of an existing block will miss in the
indirect branch hash table lookup, go back to DynamoRIO, and end up copying a
new basic block into the code cache that will duplicate the bottom half of the existing
block. The necessary checks will be added to the new block, and the block will only
be entered from the top, ensuring that we follow the security policy.
When sandboxing system calls, if the system call number is determined statically,
we avoid the sandboxing checks for system calls we are not interested in. This is
important for providing performance on applications that perform many system calls.
Restricted code cache entry points are crucial not just for building custom se-
curity policies with un-circumventable sandboxing, but also for enforcing the other
shepherding features by protecting DynamoRIO itself.
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6.6 Protecting DynamoRIO
Program shepherding could be defeated by attacking DynamoRIO's own data struc-
tures, including the code cache, which are in the same address space as the application.
This section discusses how to prevent attacks on DynamoRIO. Since the core of Dy-
namoRIO is a relatively small piece of code, and DynamoRIO does not rely on any
other component of the system, we believe extensive code review and analysis will
leave no loopholes for exploitation.
6.6.1 Memory Protection
We divide execution into two modes: DynamoRIO mode and application mode. Dy-
namoRIO mode corresponds to execution while in the top half of Figure 6-1. Appli-
cation mode corresponds to the bottom half of Figure 6-1, including the code cache
and the DynamoRIO routines that are executed without performing a context switch
back to DynamoRIO. For the two modes, we give each type of memory page the
privileges shown in Table 6.2. DynamoRIO data includes the indirect branch hash
table and other data structures.
All application and DynamoRIO code pages are write-protected in both modes.
Application data is of course writable in application mode, and there is no reason
to protect it from DynamoRIO, so it remains writable in DynamoRIO mode. Dy-
namoRIO's data and the code cache can be written to by DynamoRIO itself, but
they must be protected during application mode to prevent inadvertent or malicious
modification by the application. We should also protect RIO's Global Offset Table
(GOT) [20] by binding all imported symbols on program startup and then write-
protecting the GOT.
If a basic block copied to the code cache contains a system call that may change
page privileges, the call is sandboxed to prevent changes that violate Table 6.2. Pro-
gram shepherding's un-circumventable sandboxing guarantees that these system call
checks are executed. Because the DynamoRIO data pages and the code cache pages
are write-protected when in application mode, and we do not allow application code to
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Page Type DynamoRIO mode Application mode
Application code R R
Application data RW RW
DynamoRIO code cache RW R (E)
DynamoRIO code R (E) R
DynamoRIO data RW R
Table 6.2: Privileges of each type of memory page belonging to the application process
executed under DynamoRIO. R stands for Read, W for Write, and E for Execute. We
separate execute privileges here to make it clear what code is allowed by DynamoRIO
to execute.
change these protections, we guarantee that DynamoRIO's state cannot be corrupted
within the process.
6.6.2 Multiple Application Threads
DynamoRIO's data structures and code cache are thread-private. Each thread has its
own unique code cache and data structures. System calls that modify page privileges
are checked against the data pages of all threads. When a thread enters DynamoRIO
mode, only that thread's DynamoRIO data pages and code cache pages should be
unprotected.
A potential attack could exploit this race condition: while one thread is in Dy-
namoRIO mode another thread in application mode can modify the first thread's
DynamoRIO data pages. We could solve this problem by forcing all threads to exit
application mode when any one thread enters DynamoRIO mode. We have not yet
implemented this solution, but its performance cost would be minimal on a single
processor or on a multiprocessor when every thread is spending most of its time ex-
ecuting in the code cache. However, the performance cost of extra synchronization
would be unreasonable on a multiprocessor when threads are continuously context
switching. We are investigating alternative solutions, including those in Section 10.1.
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Chapter 7
Call Graph Construction
Constructing the call graph for a C program in the presence of indirect calls requires
use of pointer analysis to disambiguate between the potential values of the used
function pointers. Current research on pointer analyses [1, 58, 59, 15, 34] offers
different tradeoffs between accuracy and scalability. Previous points-to analyses for
C have also been specifically applied to call graph construction [33, 41].
7.1 Points-to Analysis
We have employed a context-insensitive, flow-insensitive Andersen's [1] style points-to
analysis using projection merging [59 and cycle elimination [23]. It is implemented
using the Banshee [4] analysis toolkit to build a customized constraint resolution
engine. The C front-end is derived from David Gay's Region Compiler [28] and the
GNU C Compiler. This type of points-to analysis scales very well to the size of our
target applications, and on our targets it is practically dominated by source code
preprocessing time. Flow-insensitive analysis ignores control flow and the order of
assignments, and therefore the improved scalability comes at the cost of some losses
in accuracy. However, the analysis results also hold even in concurrent programs.
Our current implementation is currently inaccurate in regards to treatment of
assignments to struct/union fields. The field names are ignored and only the base
object is looked at. Therefore, the analysis may produce larger than the actual points-
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to sets. According to the notion in [34] it is field-independent similar to the works in
[59, 15, 58]. However, field-based analyses that ignore the base are suggested [33, 41] to
be more accurate for call-graph construction. We further plan to use the intersection
of result sets of both types of analysis to provide even more accurate points-to sets.
In this thesis we will discuss only the performance of the field-independent instance
of our analysis.
7.1.1 Dynamic Linking Support
The points-to information in our system is used at runtime and therefore needs to
be efficiently propagated, and in case of position independent code relocated at run
time. Use of dynamic libraries poses new problems in respect to combining the results
of the independent local analyses on the shared objects and application executable.
Previous modular combination techniques have been used for compile time analyses
only by Das [15], and Heintze and Tardieu [34]. Our static analysis supports this
model for shared objects by symbolically evaluating arguments that contain function
pointers and thus allows binding and unification at runtime.
Currently our runtime component performs only a single level indirection of sym-
bolic arguments to obtain the full points-to sets. While this scheme supports most use
cases, it easily breaks when a structure containing function pointers is successively
crossing module boundaries. Nevertheless, in practice this crude binding technique
was sufficient to handle all SPEC2000 benchmarks, with the exception of one transi-
tion in gcc. In that case, an assignment to an obstack structure field was crossing
two module boundaries, which resulted in an incomplete transition set in the foremen-
tioned settings. Therefore, it was flagged as alarming by the runtime system. This
particular case is shown to be properly handled by a field-based analysis of structure
field assignments [41] and will be valid even across module boundaries within our
system.
The general problem of merging points-to sets, however, should be solved by com-
puting the transitive closure for all points-to sets that cross module boundaries. The
depth needed for this graph reachability analysis is determined by the maximum
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number of module boundary transitions between pointer definition and use. In order
to reduce program startup overhead, the fully expanded sets should be precomputed
together with the executable. They will need to be recomputed only in the rare occa-
sions that shared libraries are modified. The memory footprint of a straightforward
representation of the final precomputed unique sets, as observed on our benchmarks,
is in one or two 4KB pages. A self-contained security sensitive executable should
be augmented with an ELF [20] section which holds the fully precomputed points-to
sets for each indirect call and is memory mapped as read-only. Our prototype im-
plementation currently refrains from binary modifications. Furthermore, statically
available transition sets allow code auditors to easily analyze vulnerable program
address targets.
7.1.2 Matching Analysis Results with Program Binaries
Since our analysis is not in the program build process, we have to match the call-site
information we obtain from static source code analysis to the actual indirect call in-
structions in the executable. We have applied our post-process call-site matching on
locally installed or previously built program executables and shared objects. We have
experimented so far only with binaries produced by the gcc compiler, but any other
compiler may be used to build the final binary, as far as it generates accurate enough
debugging information at high optimization levels. Most calls can be unambiguously
matched since they are usually sparsely located across function and line boundaries.
However, debugging information is insufficient to disambiguate between indirect calls
on the same line. Since evaluations between sequence points are compiler implemen-
tation dependent, we occasionally have to merge points-to sets for several indirect
calls. If this analysis is used in an infrastructure with more precise code generation
information, any artifactual inaccuracy of this external matching will not be present.
On the other hand, although our current static analysis requires source code access,
debug information is usually already present and recompilation is not necessary.
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7.2 Program Profiling
Our static analysis provides a close upper bound on the points-to sets. It should
be noted that for our purposes, a safe approximation on a points-to set can even be
a lower bound on the accurate points-to set. In this respect it is opposite to the
traditional notion of conservative estimation. An automatic points-to analysis that
may miss some potential valid transitions may produce false alarms (false positives),
but it will not introduce unintended transitions in the model. Therefore an omission
in the deduced model may cause denial of service to unusual requests with legitimate
intent, but it will never allow an malicious request.
An easy way to obtain the target sets for a flow-insensitive, context-insensitive
validation in our program shepherding system is to run it in in "learning" mode to
only flag invalid indirect transitions pairs. Successive executions use the results of
previous runs as a model and allow only those transitions. This method has its own
merit, especially in the absence of source code access. However, it is prone to a
high number of false positives and for quick convergence requires profiling runs with
high code coverage. Notwithstanding these adverse effects on program correctness,
alarms on execution paths which have not been covered in test environment may be
considered useful to establishments with high security requirements.
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Chapter 8
Experimental Results
This section presents our test suite of vulnerable programs, shows the effectiveness
of our program shepherding system on this test suite, and then evaluates the perfor-
mance and memory requirements of our system on the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56].
8.1 Test Suite of Vulnerable Programs
We constructed several programs exhibiting a full spectrum of buffer overflow and
format string vulnerabilities. Our experiments also included the SPEC2000 bench-
mark applications [56] and the following applications with recently reported security
vulnerabilities:
stunnel-3.21 CVE-2002-0002 [14] A format string vulnerability in stunnel (SSL
tunnel) allows remote malicious servers to execute arbitrary code because several
calls to f dprintf (a custom file descriptor wrapper of fprintf) have no format
argument.
groff-1.16 CVE-2002-0003 [14] The preprocessor of the grof f formatting system has
an exploitable buffer overflow which allows remote attackers to gain privileges
via lpd in the LPRng printing system. The pic picture compiler from the grof f
package also has a format string vulnerability [48].
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ssh-1.2.31 CVE-2001-0144 [14] An integer-overflow bug in the CRC32 compensa-
tion attack detection code causes the SSH daemon (typically run as root) to
create a hash table with size zero in response to long input. Later attempts to
write values into the hash table provide attackers with random write access to
memory.
sudo-1.6.1 CVE-2001-0279 [14] sudo (superuser do) allows local users to gain root
privileges. A vulnerability caused by an out-of-bound access due to incomplete
end of loop condition is triggered by long command line arguments. An exploit
based on malloc corruption has been published [36].
Attack code is usually used to immediately give the attacker a root shell or to
prepare the system for easy takeover by modifying system files. Hence, the exploits
in our tests tried to either start a shell with the privilege of the running process,
typically root, or to add a root entry into the /etc/passwd file. We based our
exploits on several "cookbook" and proof-of-concept works [8, 66, 36, 48] to inject
new code [46], reuse existing code in a single call, or reuse code in a chain of multiple
calls [44]. Existing code attacks used only standard C library functions.
When run natively, our test suite exploits were able to get control by modifying
a wide variety of code pointers including return addresses; local and global function
pointers; setjmp structures; and atexit, .dtors, and GOT [20] entries. We investi-
gated attacks against DynamoRIO itself, e.g., overwriting DynamoRIO's GOT entry
to allow malicious code to run in DynamoRIO mode, but could not come up with an
attack that could bypass the protection mechanisms presented in Section 6.6.
All vulnerable programs were successfully exploited when run on a standard Red-
Hat 7.2 Linux installation. Execution of the vulnerable binaries under DynamoRIO
with all security checks disabled also allowed successful intrusions. Although Dy-
namoRIO interfered with a few of the exploits due to changed addresses in the tar-
gets, it was trivial to modify the exploits to work under our system. Execution of
the vulnerable binaries under DynamoRIO enforcing the policies shown in bold on
Table 5.1, effectively blocked all attack types. All intrusion attempts that would have
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led to successfully exploitable conditions were detected. Nevertheless, the vulnerable
applications were able to execute normally when presented with benign input. The
SPEC2000 benchmarks also gave no false alarms on the reference data set.
8.2 Effectiveness of Static Analysis
We applied our static points-to analysis and runtime execution model enforcement
of indirect branches on the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56] in C, two popular security
sensitive applications that are usually run with high privileges, the GNU C library
which is dynamically linked to all applications, as well as other supporting libraries.
We have not invested considerable time and effort to actually devise exploits for
these target applications, without being detected by the policies shown in bold in
Table 5.1. Nevertheless, specifically crafted vulnerable programs, which allow multiple
intrusions to modify function pointers, were quite easily used as proxies to all already
present system calls. It will be hard to argue that the difficulties in similar attacks to
real applications are unsurmountable, therefore we dissect the worst case scenario of
potential future attacks when the policies shown in italic in Table 5.1 are enforced.
We summarize the results for the benchmarks with nontrivial target sets in Ta-
ble 8.1. The size of the maximum set of targets for an indirect call is given, as a
measure of the largest degree of freedom for an execution deviation. (We consider
average set sizes to be a misleading metric for security assessment and instead provide
a worst case metric.) The indirect calls in the executable or the shared object are
given for reference. The size of the union of all indirect call targets in our sets is
provided for comparison with a much simpler analysis technique that allows indirect
calls to any address taken function. An even less restrictive policy that can be applied
on unstripped binaries may allow all function entry points in the executable and the
shared libraries to be in the valid target sets.
The interpreters in the benchmarks - gap and perl have high maximum call
set size due to dynamic method dispatch and that is not surprising. Inspection of
the maximum size sets of the other benchmarks show that they contain functions
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Benchmark Indirect calls Functions Union Maximum
ammp 27 191 32 16
mesa 694 1073 440 440
gap 1275 865 614 268
gcc 137 2031 269 129
perlbmk 64 1042 448 433
vortex 18 935 41 37
glibc-2.2.4.so 687 2582 380 185
sendmail-8.12.6 100 685 116 84
openssh-3.5p1 133 738 100 41
Table 8.1: Static points-to analysis results. The total number of functions and indirect
calls shown is as found in the executable or shared object. The size of the set of
functions present in the union of all target sets, and the size of the maximum set of
call targets are obtained by our analysis.
with similar behavior and their size reflects intrinsically equivalent operations for the
application, e.g. generic code generation in gcc, generic handling of multiple ciphers
in sshd. However, inaccuracies due to field-independence result in larger sets than
best obtainable. For example, the maximal size set of sshd is three times smaller
when that points-to set is decomposed over the structure fields. In terms of freedom of
choice for an attacker, most of the sets usually provide similar facilities, i.e. equivalent,
if any, system calls. Therefore control over a function pointer constrained to each of
these sets will have limited utility. We are currently automating this evaluation in
order to fully quantify the effective degree of freedom of all target sets, and to identify
potential applications of the techniques from Section 4.3.
8.3 Performance
Figure 8-1 shows the performance of our system enforcing execution model policies
of applications on a Linux system with a Pentium 4 processor. The figure shows
normalized execution time for the SPEC2000 benchmarks [561, compiled with full
optimization and run with unlimited code cache space. The first bar gives the per-
formance of DynamoRIO by itself. DynamoRIO breaks even on many benchmarks,
even though it is not performing any optimizations beyond code layout in creating
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Figure 8-1: Normalized program execution time for our system (the ratio of our
execution time to native execution time) on the SPEC2000 benchmarks (excluding
FORTRAN 90 benchmarks) on Pentium 4 under Linux. They were compiled using
gcc -03. The final set of bars is the harmonic mean. The first bar is for DynamoRIO
by itself; the middle bar shows the overhead of program shepherding (employing
context insensitive restrictions on indirect control transfers); and the final bar shows
the overhead of the page protection calls to prevent attacks against the system itself.
traces. The second bar shows the performance of program shepherding employing the
context insensitive enforcement strategies on indirect control transfers using a shared
hash table, as discussed in Section 3.2. The benchmarks marked with an asterisk were
not in C and therefore were run with static analysis based on profiling information.
The results show that the additional overhead is negligible on most benchmarks, even
without optimizing our prototype to site-specific hash tables.
The final bar gives the overhead of protecting DynamoRIO itself. This overhead
is again minimal, within the noise in our measurements for most benchmarks. Only
gcc has significant slowdown due to page protection, because it consists of several
short runs with little code re-use. We are working on improving our page protection
scheme by lazily unprotecting only those pages that are needed on each return to
DynamoRIO mode.
Dynamically constructed policies based on the bold entries in Table 5.1 for ap-
plications with no source access provide another set of performance measurements.
Figure 8-2 and Figure 8-3 show the performance of our system on a Pentium III
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Figure 8-2: Normalized program execution time for our system (the ratio of our execu-
tion time to native execution time) on the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56] (excluding all
FORTRAN 90 benchmarks) on Pentium III under Linux. They were compiled using
gcc -03. The first bar is for DynamoRIO by itself; the middle bar shows the over-
head of program shepherding (with the security policy shown in bold in Table 5.1);
and the final bar shows the overhead of the page protection calls to prevent attacks
against the system itself.
processor under Linux and Windows, respectively. Each figure shows normalized ex-
ecution time for the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56], compiled with full optimization and
run with unlimited code cache space. (Note that we do not have a FORTRAN 90
compiler on Linux or any FORTRAN compiler on Windows.) The first bar gives the
performance of DynamoRIO by itself. The slightly lower performance of the base
system on a Pentium 4 compared to a Pentium III likely results from aggressive mi-
croarchitectural optimizations that improve native execution but interact inefficiently
with our runtime system (e.g. return stack buffer, trace cache for [-ops). The second
bar shows the performance of program shepherding enforcing the policies shown in
bold in Table 5.1. Resricted control transfers are enforced by hash table partitions on
instruction type. The results show that the overhead of program shepherding enforc-
ing these policies is indistinguishable from the overhead of the base system. This is
also expected to be the case for transition pair enforcement using hash tables per-site.
The final bar gives the protection overhead on each operating system. The pre-
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Figure 8-3: Normalized program execution time for our system (the ratio of our exe-
cution time to native execution time) on the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56] (excluding
all FORTRAN benchmarks) on Pentium III under Windows 2000. They were com-
piled using cl /Ox. The first bar is for DynamoRIO by itself; the middle bar shows
the overhead of program shepherding (with the security policy shown in bold in Ta-
ble 5.1); and the final bar shows the overhead of the page protection calls to prevent
attacks against the system itself.
viously noted slowdowns on several benchmarks are seriously exarcebated on Win-
dows, especially gcc. We conjecture that the significant difference between slowdowns
on protection on Linux and Windows is because Windows is much less efficient at
changing privileges on memory pages than Linux due to coarse grain invalidations
and significantly many subsequent TLB misses.
8.4 Memory usage
The memory usage of our security system is shown in Table 8.2. All sizes shown are in
KB. The left half of the table shows the total size of text sections of each benchmark
and all shared libraries it uses compared to the amount of code actually executed.
The third column gives the percentage of the total static code that is executed. The
right half of Table 8.2 shows the memory overhead of DynamoRIO compared to
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the memory usage of each benchmark. For most benchmarks the memory used by
DynamoRIO is a small fraction of the total memory used natively.
By operating dynamically, our system is able to focus on the small portion of code
that is run, whereas a static approach would have to examine the text sections in their
entirety. However, whenever multiple copies of a process are executed simultaneously
these metrics may provide an incomplete picture. On modern operating systems
static code is usually shared across processes and multiple instances do not require
additional physical memory. When such programs are executed under DynamoRIO,
the portion of their executed code will be duplicated in code cache in private pages
per process. Therefore it may result in higher physical memory requirements. On
the other hand, if multiple instances operate on different data and hence exercise
different code paths, each copy will be specialized for its particular instance. We have
yet not quantified these effects in systems with a lot of sharing or with variations
of application workload mixes. Still, we are considering schemes for efficient sharing
between code caches of different processes in order to minimize memory overheads.
64
benchmark static code executed code % executed native I DynamoRIO % extra
ammp 1515 52 3.4% 14893 1696 11.4%
applu 1597 181 11.3% 195715 2720 1.4%
apsi 1639 179 10.9% 197016 2208 1.1%
art 1424 22 1.5% 4612 928 20.1%
bzip2 1317 30 2.3% 190767 928 0.5%
crafty 1467 169 11.5% 3418 3232 94.6%
eon 2114 269 12.7% 2721 2208 81.1%
equake 1428 39 2.7% 34255 928 2.7%
gap 1713 167 9.7% 198916 4256 2.1%
gcc 2518 729 29.0% 145547 14496 10.0%
gzip 1323 27 2.0% 186374 928 0.5%
mcf 1289 24 1.9% 98516 928 0.9%
mesa 1885 63 3.3% 22812 1696 7.4%
mgrid 1475 63 4.3% 58233 1184 2.0%
parser 1390 114 8.2% 32407 3232 10.0%
perlbmk 1878 286 15.2% 76272 6304 8.3%
sixtrack 2812 347 12.3% 60786 4256 7.0%
swim 1452 44 3.0% 196433 928 0.5%
twolf 1591 124 7.8% 4256 3232 75.9%
vortex 1890 395 20.9% 50390 6304 12.5%
vpr 1540 114 7.4% 40425 2208 5.5%
wupwise 1477 67 4.5% 181527 1696 0.9%
arithmetic mean 1670 159 8.5% 90741[ 3023 16.2%
harmonic mean - 4.5% -- - 1.8%
Table 8.2: Memory usage of the SPEC2000 benchmarks [56], in KB, on Linux. For
benchmarks with multiple data sets, the run with the maximum memory usage is
shown. Static code is the total size of the text sections of the benchmark and all
shared libraries it uses. Executed code is the total size of all instructions processed
by DynamoRIO when running the benchmark. Extra memory is the total memory
used by DynamoRIO code, code caches and other DynamoRIO data. Native total is
total memory used by the benchmark when run natively (outside of DynamoRIO).
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Chapter 9
Related Work
Reflecting the significance and popularity of buffer overflow and format string attacks,
there have been several other efforts to provide automatic protection and detection
of these vulnerabilities. We summarize here the more successful ones.
StackGuard [13] is a compiler patch that modifies function prologues to place "ca-
naries" adjacent to the return address pointer. A stack buffer overflow will modify
the "canary" while overwriting the return pointer, and a check in the function epi-
logue can detect that condition. This technique is successful only against sequential
overwrites and protects only the return address. Attacks exploiting random access
memory writes or targeting other program addresses are therefore not affected.
FormatGuard [12] is a library patch for dynamic checks of format specifiers to
detect format string vulnerabilities. However, it is limited to programs which directly
use the standard printf library functions without using custom wrappers around
them.
Static analyses have also been applied for detection of very common classes of
vulnerabilities as buffer overflow [63] and format string [54] vulnerabilities. When
capturing most common cases, these tools report relatively low false positive rates.
StackGhost [26] is an example of hardware-facilitated return address pointer pro-
tection. It is a kernel modification of OpenBSD that uses a Sparc architecture trap
when a register window has to be written to or read from the stack, so it performs
transparent xor operations on the return address before it is written to the stack
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on function entry and before it is used for control transfer on function exit. Return
address corruption results in a transfer unintended by the attacker, and thus attacks
can be foiled unless attackers are able to read the process addresses.
Techniques for stack smashing protection by keeping copies of the actual return ad-
dresses in an area inaccessible to the application are also proposed in StackGhost [26]
and in the compiler patch StackShield [61]. Both proposals suffer from various compli-
cations in the presence of multi-threading or deviations from a strict calling convention
by setjmp(o or exceptions. Unless the memory areas are unreadable by the appli-
cation, there is no hard guarantee that an attack targeted against a given protection
scheme can be foiled. On the other hand, if the return stack copy is protected for the
duration of a function execution, it has to be unprotected on each call, and that can
be prohibitively expensive (mprotect on Linux on IA-32 is 60-70 times more expen-
sive than an empty function call). Techniques for write-protection of stack pages [13]
have also shown significant performance penalties.
Enforcing non-executable permissions on IA-32 via OS kernel patches has been
done for stack pages [18] and for data pages in PaX [49]. Our system provides exe-
cution protection from user mode on unmodified binaries and achieves better steady
state performance. Protection against attacks using existing code was also proposed
in PaX by randomizing placement of position independent code; however, it is open
to attacks that are able to read process addresses and thus determine the program
layout.
Type safety of C code has been proposed by the CCured system [43] which extends
the C type system, infers statically verifiable type safe pointers, and adds run time
checks only for unsafe pointers. Cyclone [35] provides a safe dialect of C in a similar
fashion, but requires annotations in conversion of legacy code. The reported overhead
of these systems is in the 30-300% range. We present a much easier to adopt system
that requires no recompilation or code modification.
Other programming bugs stemming from violations of specific higher level seman-
tic rules of safe programming have been targeted by static analyses like CQUAL [25],
ESP [16], MC [31], and static model checkers SLAM [60], MOPS [10]. In an unsafe
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language like C, techniques that claim to be sound do not hold in the presence of vio-
lations of the memory and execution model assumed in the analyses [60]. Our system
may be used to complement these approaches and enforce the execution model of the
application.
Most host-based intrusion detection systems focus on the sequences of system
calls executed by an application [24, 30, 27, 50, 62, 40]. The mimicry attacks in-
troduced [62] and further analyzed by Wagner [64] show how attackers can easily
evade existing intrusion detection at the system call level by introducing undetected
sequences of system calls. Our example from Section 5.4.2 is an information flow [32]
mimicry attack. While we agree that system calls contain all externally visible secu-
rity relevant program actions, we also argue that system call interposition provides an
incomplete interface for containing attacks. Allowing malicious code to masquarade
as the normal application, and divert its system call trace is already too empowering.
Our system is close in spirit to the hybrid approach of using static analysis and
runtime model checking proposed by Wagner and Dean [62]. A static analysis is
used to construct a finite state automaton recognizing the system calls possibly gen-
erated by a program, a runtime component to simulate the nondeterministic model
space, and a system call interposition tool to verify the generated by the program
sequence. The finite automata are generated based on assumed valid execution mod-
els - context-insensitive represented as a call graph, or context-sensitive as result
of modeling a runtime stack. Our system is as at least as accurate in detection of
malicious system call sequences, since it disallows any deviations from the execution
model they assume. The non-determinism in the generated finite automata often has
high runtime simulation overheads for the more accurate models. Our techniques sub-
sume the need to further model and dynamically check system calls, and we present
a practical system with minimal overhead. An extension to the runtime model check-
ing applicable to the case of remote execution systems has been presented [29]. The
addition of network based attacks drastically changes the threat model, and the large
network latency dwarfs the overheads of NFA simulation. Hence, direct applicability
to host based intrusion detection is likely to be inefficient.
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The indirect call target sets in both [62, 29] are considered to contain all address
taken functions. This is obtained either by source code [62] or binary code [29]
analysis. The call graphs in our models are much more accurate as obtained by a
points-to analysis. The possibility of adapting a points-to analysis to binary code
is hypothesized [29] and that will be an interesting area of research. Both [62,
29] address the issue of argument manipulation. However, the proposed techniques
already allow arguments that can be changed dynamically - and in our system
statically determined by the existing code arguments cannot be modified by attackers.
Accurate containment of argument replacement attacks is not yet effectively addressed
by most other IDS.
Software fault isolation techniques [65, 55] modify a program binary to restrict
the address range of memory operations. Execution monitors [52] were applied in
SASI [22] to enforce a memory model via static code instrumentation. These systems
have much higher overheads due to heavy-weight sandboxing operations and inability
to elide them from critical paths.
Our base system infrastructure itself, DynamoRIO [6, 7], is based on an IA-32
port of Dynamo [3]. Other software dynamic optimizers are Wiggins/Redstone [17],
which employs program counter sampling to form traces that are specialized for the
particular Alpha machine they are running on, and Mojo [11], which targets Windows
NT running on IA-32. None of the above has been used for anything other than
optimization. Strata [53] uses dynamic translation with lower performance to enforce
a subset of the techniques we have presented earlier [38].
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Chapter 10
Future Work
The performance results show that our prototype is an already practical system.
We are continuing our optimization efforts and believe that good engineering will
yield close to zero overheads in all aspects of the system. Many opportunities for
optimization exist in the base system and it is gradually improved with respect to
latest microarchitecture specifics. Better trace creation heuristics will result in easily
reachable steady state which has no overheads. We have already delineated how the
security policy enforcement can be implemented with minimal additional overhead.
The costs of protection with the current system can readily go down with an on-
demand protection changes. Nevertheless, we present here alternative solutions to
these problems when supported by the operating system or underlying hardware.
10.1 Operating System Extensions
The described so far technique allows a program shepherding implementation solely
in one protection domain - it may be an application or an OS kernel. A program
shepherding system protecting user mode applications, as our current prototype, can
benefit from further facilities already provided by the hardware memory management
unit. Operating support will be needed in order to take advantage of these privileged
facilities. On most computer architectures including IA32, a supervisor privilege bit
determines whether a particular page is writable. All pages that need to be read-only
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in application mode, but writable in shepherding mode, can be marked as supervisor
pages. The protection bits of the pages will thus be static and will not need to be
modified between the two contexts. Switching contexts will then have the cost of a
kernel trap and will be free of race conditions. Additional techniques for improving
context switch performance, including use of segmentation hardware are discussed in
CoVirt [37].
10.2 Hardware Support
The currently implemented system does not require any hardware support and yet
achieves minimal overheads. In order to fully remove the checks from critical ex-
ecution paths for maximum performance some components of the system can be
implemented in hardware. Our requirements often overlap substantially with already
existing hardware facilities. Therefore they only require minimal modifications for an
interface with a program shepherding system, whenever a fast hardware path fails.
Modern processors cache control data that needs to be validated only when it is put
in the cache. Examples of these are the instruction translation look-aside buffers
(TLB); Branch Target Address Caches (BTAC) used for indirect branch prediction;
and return stack buffers (RSB) used for return target prediction. Traps on mispredic-
tion or cache misses will often allow software to handle the slow paths and perform
the security checks needed.
Intel's processors have included a return stack buffer (RSB) since the Pentium
Pro [47]. The RSB is of limited size and is used as a branch predictor for return
instructions. On a call the return address is pushed onto the RSB, and on a return
the top RSB value is popped and used as the predicted target of the return. Since
the hardware is storing each return address, it is only natural to propose using the
RSB to enforce the calling convention.
Exposing the RSB to software might be done by allowing read and write access.
Then a program shepherding system could monitor every call and return and insert
code to handle underflow and overflow and code to compare the RSB prediction to
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the real return address. On overflow, the RSB is copied to memory which is then
protected. On underflow, the most recent saved RSB copy is written in to the RSB.
For better performance only half of the RSB is stored and swapped in, with the upper
half being shifted down on overflow, to prevent thrashing due to frequent minor call
depth changes.
A further level of hardware support would be to add traps for underflow, overflow,
and RSB misprediction. Then the software need not impose instrumentation on every
call and return; it would simply need to handle the traps.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions
This thesis introduced program shepherding, which employs the techniques of re-
stricted code origins, restricted control transfers, and un-circumventable sandboxing
to provide strong security guarantees. We have implemented program shepherding
in the DynamoRIO runtime system, which does not rely on hardware, operating sys-
tem, or compiler support, and operates on unmodified binaries on both generic Linux
and Windows IA-32 platforms. We have shown that our implementation successfully
prevents a wide range of security attacks efficiently. We have shown that by enforcing
the program's execution model by restricting control transfers, we are able to thwart
current and future security attacks. We incorporate static program analysis with
dynamic analysis and program transformations to provide an efficient enforcement of
the execution model.
We have discussed the potential design space of security policies that can be built
using program shepherding. Our system currently implements a set of policy settings
for trusted binaries with no source access, and a stricter set when source is available.
We are expanding the set of security policies that our system can provide without
significant loss of performance. Future expansions include using more semantic in-
formation provided by compilers to specify permissible operations on a fine-grained
level, and performing explicit protection and monitoring of known program addresses
to prevent corruption. For example, protecting the application's GOT [20] and al-
lowing updates only by the dynamic resolver can easily be implemented in a secure
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and efficient fashion.
Program shepherding does not prevent exploits that overwrite sensitive data.
However, if assertions about such data are verified in all functions that use it, these
verifications cannot be bypassed if they are the only declared entry points. Further-
more, data modifications that lead to a conditional control flow shift may still be
approachable by an extension of this technique. Infeasible execution paths as a result
of data changes in between guarding conditional branches may be detected to point
out memory model violations due to security attacks or unspecified race conditions.
A potential application of program shepherding is to allow operating system ser-
vices to be moved to more efficient user-level libraries. For example, in the exoker-
nel [21] operating system, the usual operating system abstractions are provided by
unprivileged libraries, giving efficient control of system resources to user code. Pro-
gram shepherding can enforce unique entry points in these libraries, enabling the
exokernel to provide better performance without sacrificing security.
We believe that program shepherding will be an integral part of future security
systems. It is relatively simple to implement, has little or no performance penalty, and
can coexist with existing operating systems, applications, and hardware to provide an
easy adoption path. Many other security components can be built on top of the un-
circumventable sandboxing provided by program shepherding. Program shepherding
provides useful security guarantees that drastically reduce the potential damage from
attacks.
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